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Latin American Trends

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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

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Argentina-Cuba: Castro Support for Local Subversion?

Two leftist subversives in the hands of Argentine authorities have detailed what they claim is Cuban support for terrorism in Argentina.

Argentine security forces last month captured Patricio Biedma and Mario Espinosa, Chileans who for some time had been working for the terrcrist cause in Argentina. Biedma says he was both the leader of Chile's Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) in Argentina and that group's delegate to the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR), a loose coalition of regional terrorist organizations. Espinosa claims also to have been a MIR member and most recently a combatant for the Argentine Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP).

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Biedma states that he met frequently with an officer of the Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires who "on a regular basis" provided funds for the JCR as well as for the ERP and Montoneros.

Bledma also claims that Havana has channeled funds to the ERP and Montoneros through a courier sent by a circuitous route to Buenos Aires.

Espinosa echoes the assertion that Cuba's embassy provides funds to Argentine leftists and says that he himself was trained in Cuba and then introduced to the ERP by a Cuban contact in Argentina.

Argentine authorities began investigating links between the terrorists and the Cuban embassy almost immediately following the March coup. By mid-summer the Argentines were said to be nearly certain that the embassy was providing a safe haven for top ERP members and others associated with that group.



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the junta would not hesitate to take "harsh action" against the Cubans if Havana's involvement were firmly established. Indeed, security officials may have been responsible for the abduction and apparently killing of two Cuban embassy officers last month.

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